Political discourses and their migration and colonisation were the foci of my PhD thesis.
Political propaganda throughout the time and countries as a tool to gain and keep political power
In ten seconds? Political propaganda has always been a a tool to gain and keep political power, and the propagandist rhetoric migrates from the past to the present and from one country to another.
What does come to your mind when you think about the political propaganda? Is it a communist propaganda or advertising around the Trump (or anti-Trump) presidential campaign and Brexit and anti-Brexit?
When researchers analyse the political discourses they often see that the propagandist discourses migrate from one epoch to another and from one country to another.
Good examples are modern Russia claiming to be a new political and economic superpower similar to what the Soviet Union was, the famous slogan Make America Great Again stemming from the Reagan 1980 presidential campaign, and 1930s Nazi rhetorical methodology applied by the Labour Party in Norway.
The word propaganda for many of us has a negative connotation. Indeed, political propaganda most likely (with some exceptions) serves the politicians or other related players as a tool to gain and keep political power: to win elections or to distract people’s attention to external enemy from the national or regional problems.
by Anna Firsova
Abstract: Authors: Furneaux ; H. Article URL: http://ahr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/121/4/1360?rss=1 Citation: Vol 121 No. 4 (2016) pp 1360 1360 Publication Date: 2016-10-05T09:36:13-07:00 Journal: American Historical Review
Pub.: 05 Oct '16, Pinned: 26 Apr '17
Abstract: Authors: Martin Lehmann Article URL: http://cogentoa.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311983.2016.1152785?ai=1feq6&mi=6b657i&af=R Citation: Cogent Arts & Humanities Publication Date: 2016-03-17T06:06:41Z Journal: Cogent Arts & Humanities
Pub.: 17 Mar '16, Pinned: 10 May '17
Abstract: The Trump phenomenon is argued to depart from current populist rise in Europe. According to a model of opinion dynamics from sociophysics the machinery of Trump's amazing success obeys well-defined counter-intuitive rules. Therefore, his success was in principle predictable from the start. The model uses local majority rule arguments and obeys a threshold dynamics. The associated tipping points are found to depend on the leading collective beliefs, cognitive biases and prejudices of the social group which undertakes the public debate. And here comes the sesame of the Trump campaign, which develops along two successive steps. During a first moment, Trump's statement produces a majority of voters against him. But at the same time, according to the model the shocking character of the statement modifies the prejudice balance. In case the prejudice is present even being frozen among voters, the tipping point is lowered at Trump's benefit. Nevertheless, although the tipping point has been lowered by the activation of frozen prejudices it is instrumental to preserve enough support from openly prejudiced people to be above the threshold. Then, as infuriated voters launch intense debate, occurrence of ties will drive progressively hostile people to shift their voting intention without needing to endorse the statement which has infuriated them. The on going debate does drive towards a majority for Trump. The possible Trump victory at November Presidential election is discussed. In particular, the model shows that to eventually win the Presidential election, Trump must not modify his past shocking attitude but to appeal to a different spectrum of frozen prejudices, which are common to both Democrats and Republicans.
Pub.: 13 Sep '16, Pinned: 26 Apr '17
Abstract: Does the electoral success of Islamist parties depend on the support of religious voters or does it owe as much or more to their performance in dealing with key political and economic issues? The repeated electoral success of an Islamist-rooted party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey, provides an important opportunity to answer this question. Using a nation-wide survey conducted in 2011 in Turkey, our findings suggest that in addition to religiosity the party’s performance with respect to social services, the economy and democracy were determining factors in the AKP’s success. We also found that the popularity of political leaders has an independent effect on party preference. We discuss similar tendencies in the aftermath of the Arab Spring elections where the Islamist parties emerged as the major winners.
Pub.: 02 May '16, Pinned: 24 Apr '17
Abstract: The immense success of post WWI Europeantotalitarian regimes form the backdrop for this study. Political success is often credited cleverly crafted communication strategies. The Norwegian Labour Party applied methods similar to those found in Nazi Germany as of 1933/34, luring voters away from the dogmatic Right and Left, to the leftist social democratic movement. One key element of this highly successful strategy is the shift from a somber accentuation on methods of scientific persuasion, emphasizing a perceived rationale of a social system based in Marxism, to propaganda, bombarding masses with slogans and one-liners. Another key element is an acknowledgement of indifferent voters. The vast majority of the voter potential did not attend political meeting and were unable to recognize and separate ideologies. This led party strategists to developing methodologieson how to approach voters as crowds, not merely as individual citizens in large numbers. Recognizing the homogeneity and protective environment of the Darwinian herd, crowds became target groups for the Labour Party election campaigns, in which they found gratification by unison songs, theatrical entertainment and simple slogans.
Pub.: 18 Mar '17, Pinned: 24 Apr '17
Abstract: Two types of translation dominated the social sphere of the Bolshevik revolution and civil war at the beginning of the twentieth century: the translation of diverse languages in the multilingual empire and a Marxist-Leninist linguistic turn that emphasized the role of dialectical materialist philosophy in transforming systems of knowledge to create new forms of collective Soviet identity. By examining political speeches and propaganda on the Soviet periphery, this essay argues that the translation of communism across the Muslim national platform exposes the power of this Marxist-Leninist linguistic turn during the early twentieth century in generating fluid linkages among language, art, and Soviet political and cultural life. Analyzing the forms and practice of the translation of Muslim communism, this essay illustrates the ways that translation both reflected and refracted the language and art of Russian orientalism as it generated a vision of Soviet modernity in the former imperial territories.
Pub.: 11 Jul '16, Pinned: 30 May '17
Abstract: We analyze using computer simulations, the evolution of opinions in a population of individuals who constantly interact with a common source of user-generated content (i.e. the internet) and are also subject to propaganda. The model is based on the bounded confidence approach. In the absence of propaganda, computer simulations show that the online population as a whole is either fragmented, polarized or in perfect harmony on a certain issue or ideology depending on the uncertainty of individuals in accepting opinions not closer to theirs.On applying the model to simulate radicalization, we observe that a proportion of the online population, subject to extremist propaganda radicalize depending on their pre-conceived opinions and opinion uncertainty. We observe that, an optimal counter propaganda that prevents radicalization is not necessarily centrist.
Pub.: 29 Mar '17, Pinned: 24 Apr '17
Abstract: We began this article by asking whether the Polish crisis is a “socialist” or a “Polish” disease. By citing the structural factors, we brought out the common difficulties affecting all East European societies in their political and economic development. These difficulties arose out of the transition from extensive to intensive economic growth and the consequent need to replace political mobilization of the population with their political integration. The structural contradictions occurred together with conjunctural developments in the world economy, the collapse of detente, the post-war demographic explosion, and natural calamities. Poland was least able to cope with these structural and conjunctural dynamics. The result was a society united on a national basis in its conflicts with the Party State apparatus. This conflict was never resolved by Solidarity nor by the subsequent military coup.While Poland and Romania had quite similar structural and conjunctural dynamics, it was only in Poland that the constellation of nation-specific factors yielded a societal reaction of system-threatening character. Looking at the rest of Eastern Europe, we do not see a similar constellation of factors. Rather, the combination of structural, conjunctural, and specific conditions has prevented the deeper contradictions from evolving into Solidarity-type mass movements of the Polish variety. Thus, we believe that the Polish developments will not be replicated in any of the other East European countries in the foreseeable future.Does this mean that the Polish experience is so unique that it is without relevance for the other East European states? On the contrary, the recognition of common structural problems points to fundamental conflicts in all the countries of “actually existing socialism.” The essence of these conflicts may be the same. It is the ability to identify and deal with them that distinguishes one East European regime from another. This ability varies with the specific and conjunctural factors as applied to each country. While there is little likelihood that the Polish “disease” will spread, this is partly because the other East European states are beginning to take “preventive measures.” In other words, they are “learning” from the Polish experience.There are several indicators that these regimes have learned from the Polish crisis. We can summarize them in the following predictions:First, we believe that state power and the repressive apparatus of the various East European countries will be reinforced and made more effective. This applies not so much to overt shows of force but to more sophisticated methods of social control and repression: e.g., limiting information channels, dispersing dissident groups, giving in to workers protests before they spread, taking practical measures to prevent consumer shortages from getting out of hand, and the like.Second, we can expect that oppositional forces, especially intellectuals, will be increasingly restricted in their ability to formulate and articulate system-threatening demands. The East European states will take any measures - jail, slander, internal deportation, cooptation, forced emigration - to make sure that intellectuals' contact with workers is weakened or at least strictly supervised.Third, we can expect the Eastern European states to take further measures to integrate potential system-threatening movements into the official system. We will see further attempts to improve the access possibilities for those social interests that have up to now been neglected, e.g. in physical and social infrastructures, neglected regions. Moreover, there will be renewed efforts to make the system of political socialization (education, propaganda, culture) more effective. Finally, we can expect anti-corruption campaigns within the State, Party, and industrial bureaucracies as the elites attempt to make these organs more legitimate in the eyes of the population.In recent months there seems to be considerable evidence that the East European regimes have taken all these measures. There have been attempts to re-invigorate the official trade unions. Yuri Andropov's succession was marked by a highly publicized anti-corruption campaign designed to win favor among rank-and-file workers. In Romania there have been exhortations towards more self-sufficiency and self-management, so that individual producers will be less dependent on State retail outlets, and the country less dependent on costly foreign imports. The reduction in East-West trade and decline of detente have also given more leeway for the East European repressive apparatus to crack down on dissidents and oppositional movements.With reduced trade, the economic benefits of detente no longer exist as a restraining factor on the authorities. The West now has reduced influence on domestic politics in East Europe. The combination of integration and repressive measures has so far prevented the structural contradictions from growing into true political crises of the Polish variety. Eastern Europe (and Poland) is remarkably quiet.With the broad enthusiasm fostered in the West by the rise of “Solidarity,” it is understandable that its brutal demise had generated parallel feelings of disillusionment. It would be erroneous to consider the Polish events as an archetype for Eastern Europe. The problems of East European regimes reflect a general system crisis (economic and political), each country's response depends on specific local conditions and fortuitous conjunctures. If the Polish events are to be understood, they must be explained as a variant in a larger East European context.Having concentrated on the crisis aspects in Poland and Romania should not blind us from the fact that these systems have an amazing ability to reproduce themselves - to “muddle through.” “Actually existing socialism” is more than simply brute force. Each of the East European societies exhibits a complex dialectic between the forces of functional stability and the forces of immanent contradictions. As such, in addition to their structural aspects, we must analyze each of these societies in their differing vulnerability to conjunctural events and in their specific political, social, and cultural characters.For those who seek to replace “actually existing socialism” with a more emancipatory socialism, the Polish crisis constitutes a key point of departure. It should be discussed both in terms of what it means for Poland, and for Eastern Europe. The Polish events provide further evidence that the tasks of social theory reside as much in explaining why societies “muddle through” as why they fall apart.
Pub.: 01 Nov '84, Pinned: 24 Apr '17
Abstract: This paper examines the influence of political propaganda on voters and analyses the behavior of the interest groups in the face of the influence being exercised. By propaganda semitruths are distributed among the electorate. The decision taken by a voter results from his basic opinion and from the parts of information he receives. The analysis shows that the greater the likelihood of a certain decision being reached by a fully informed electorate, the more probable it is that the same decision will be reached by a rationally uninformed electorate. The pecuniary interest of an interest group is, however, also positively correlated with the probability that the electorate reaches a decision which is agreeable to that interest group. It has finally become apparent that the results of the approach concur well with empirical studies.
Pub.: 01 Mar '94, Pinned: 24 Apr '17
Abstract: Rational voters' assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased, but affected by random errors. "Clean" information decreases these errors, while "dirty" information increases them. In politics, most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically. Thus, such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate. They systematically affect politics. This illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups. It helps to explain various puzzles in Public Choice, e.g., the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments. Institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians' incentives to produce dirty information.
Pub.: 01 Jan '96, Pinned: 24 Apr '17
Abstract: The aim of this essay is to point out the characteristic traits of the new Chinese literature as a “specific interliterary community” to some extent different from most of the “specific interliterary communities” of the world, for instance, Czech and Slovak literature, the Slavic literatures of Eastern Europe, or the literatures of the former socialist countries. Different from these and other communities of this kind, the new Chinese literature, especially after 1949, did not proceed with the interliterary process without points of friction, sometimes even with mutual attacks and mutual disrespect caused by political reasons: ideological differences, contradictory aims, neglect of human rights, democratic tendencies, and political propaganda. The interliterary process along which the new Chinese literature, or better to say “literatures,” is progressing, is here stressed together with “interliterariness,” the overstepping of one single literature and its coming into contact with one or more single literatures of the world. The interliterary community of Chinese literature within the whole set of its single literatures (from the mainland of China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and overseas Chinese literatures) presents an area where three different functions play their roles, of which at least one should be implemented: integrational, differentiating, and complementary. To understand the new Chinese literature in its relations within itself and the literatures of the world is a task to be fulfilled in the coming decades.
Pub.: 19 May '11, Pinned: 24 Apr '17
Abstract: For years and years, the Olympic Charter, as the “constitution” of the Olympic movement, encompasses a provision that prevents athletes from making political statements and propaganda at the Olympic sites under the threat of disciplinary sanctions. A broad range of acts and statements have as such been banned and/or sanctioned, the scope and nature of political statement being undefined. Although the policy is upheld by the International Olympic Committee as guardian of the Charter, it can seriously be questioned whether this rule is in conformity with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights laying down the right to freedom of expression. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights shows, amongst others, that preventing persons from making critical remarks or from wearing vestimentary symbols in public via excessive sanctions might interfere with their freedom of (political) expression and therefore with Article 10 of the Convention. Whereas it is true that the rights and freedoms of the Convention do not have horizontal direct effect, in the sense that they are directly applicable in private relationships, States are under a positive obligation to safeguard the rights laid down therein, even in relationships between private parties.
Pub.: 07 Oct '14, Pinned: 24 Apr '17
Abstract: Village halls [Romanian: cămine culturale] appeared in many Europeancountries and elsewhere as early as the nineteenth century and multiplied in the twentieth.The presence of these institutions in the rural world, despite obvious differences in theirgoals and activities, demonstrates a general interest in the cultural development ofvillages, as well as the emergence and growth of leisure practices amongst peasants. Thisessay is not a study of the history of village halls; rather, it focuses on the changes that thisinstitution underwent in the early years of the communist regime in Romania. It analyseshow communists transformed the village hall into a place of propaganda under theguise of “cultural work”. The study starts from the premise that communist propagandadeliberately did not distinguish between “political work” and “cultural work”. At the endof the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, the village hall became the communist regime’scentral venue for disseminating political and cultural propaganda.
Pub.: 30 Dec '15, Pinned: 24 Apr '17
Abstract: Contrary to the focus on the events of the last two years (2014–2015) associated with the accession of Crimea to Russia and military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, in this study, I stress that serious changes in Russian domestic policy (with strong pressure on political opposition, state propaganda and sharp anti-Western rhetoric, as well as the fight against “foreign agents’) became visible in 2012. Geopolitical ambitions to revise the “global order” (introduced by the USA after the collapse of the USSR) and the increased role of Russia in “global governance” were declared by leaders of the country much earlier, with Vladimir Putin's famous Munich speech in 2007. These ambitions were based on the robust economic growth of the mid-2000s, which encouraged the Russian ruling elite to adopt the view that Russia (with its huge energy resources) is a new economic superpower. In this paper, I will show that the concept of “Militant Russia” in a proper sense can be attributed rather to the period of the mid-2000s. After 2008–2009, the global financial crisis and, especially, the Arab Spring and mass political protests against electoral fraud in Moscow in December 2011, the Russian ruling elite made mostly “militant” attempts to defend its power and assets.
Pub.: 02 Jul '16, Pinned: 24 Apr '17
Abstract: to discuss the symbolic effects of the publication on written press of institutional rites related to the courses promoted by the Brazilian Federal District's Schools of Nursing during the Second World War.exploratory and documentary study, whose sources were treated by historical method.one noticed, in the news reports analyzed, that the Brazilian Estado Novo has used nurses images to divulge within the society the woman's acting altruistic model in service to the country, through the systematic diffusion by the press of her honorable acting during the war, what assured the amplification of the visibility and acknowledgment of the Nursing profession in that context.the diffusion by press of emergency nurses graduations magnified their apparition in public spaces, occasion on which the institutional rite was strategically used to transmit to the society the urgency of the new profession, in order to support the political causes in vigor in the country.
Pub.: 14 Apr '17, Pinned: 24 Apr '17