Indexed on: 01 Jun '70Published on: 01 Jun '70Published in: Continental Philosophy Review
The author claims that there is a basic difference between theTractatus and thePhilosophical Investigations; despite Bernstein's and O'Brien's claims to the contrary, there are, indeed, ‘two Wittgensteins.’ Yet, to ascertain the difference between both we must look at Wittgenstein's conceptions of philosophy rather than at his views on logic and language. Wittgenstein's different, and even divergent, views on logic and language are grounded on his two views on philosophy and not the other way around. At the same time, Wittgenstein's views on philosophy are caused by his ways of conceiving the scope of philosophical activity in regard to language. Both in theTractatus and in thePhilosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein points out what is important in language for philosophy, but in each case he reaches very different conclusions. Now, when all is said, there remains one unifying factor in all of Wittgenstein's ‘investigations’: it is the question of the ‘logic of language,’ which shifts positions from theTractatus to theInvestigations, so that what was earlier a ‘hidden structure’ becomes later the ‘grammar’ of its indefinitely complexe uses.